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Is Cash-Return relation risk induced? 
LIU Chenxi 
Singapore Management University 
 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract: Corporate cash holding is found to be able to predict stock return. 
Some scholars attribute this to the association of cash with systematic risk with 
respect to growth options. Others find that the relation is a mispricing effect. In 
this paper, I try to test whether the relation between cash and return is driven by 
systematic risk that captured by cash. The empirical results do not support the risk 
explanation of cash-return relation. First, the risk loading on CASH factor cannot 
predict returns, which is not consistent with rational frictionless asset pricing 
models. Second, CASH factor cannot reflect future GDP growth. Third, CASH 
and its factor loading exhibit no association with implied cost of capital derived 
from analysts‟ earnings forecasts. Also, it is found that institutional investors tend 
to hold more shares of companies whose cash holdings intend to be high in the 
next period and the return spread by cash in firms with more institutional 
ownerships is lower than that in firms with less institutional ownerships. Overall, 
this paper casts doubt on the argument that cash can serve as a proxy of 
systematic risk in the explanation of cross sectional variation in stock returns, 
while it supports a mispricing explanation. 
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1. Introduction 
In the paper of Palazzo [2012, Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns, Journal of 
Financial Economics, 104(1), 162-185], a relation between cash holdings and expected 
return is built based on the precautionary motivation for firms to hold cash. The idea of 
his paper is that firms save assets as cash to avoid the costly external funding when cash 
flow is highly positively correlated with aggregate shocks, indicating firms tend to hold 
cash to hedge on risk (higher correlation between cash flow and aggregate shocks) and 
hence firms with more cash have higher subsequent returns to compensate on this risk. 
Empirically he shows the spread return of portfolios sorted by cash cannot be fully 
explained by Fama French three factors, suggesting that the risk captured by cash 
holdings is different from market systematic risk, small size risk and low value risk. His 
paper indicates cash can serve as a risk proxy (Simutin, 2010). However, although the 
paper does provide evidence that cash holdings can explain cross sectional variations in 
stock returns, whether this relation is risk induced is not sophisticatedly evidenced. 
Besides the rational asset pricing theory, behavior finance is another important strand to 
explain the variation in stock returns. Researchers have found some anomalies with 
respect to accounting information, such as accrual anomaly (e.g., Sloan, 1996) and net 
operating assets (e.g., Hirshlefer et al., 2004), cannot be explained by rational theories. 
Instead, these anomalies are found to be attributed to mispricing caused by investors‟ 
limits of attention on the information contained in these financial numbers. Cash is also a 
kind of financial information. From perspective of corporate finance, the amount of cash 
held by firms is subject to two important reasons: financial constraints (Almeida, 2004) 
and agency problems (Jensen, 1986). The financial constraint story indicates positive 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2900072 
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impacts of large cash holdings, while the agency problem story indicates negative 
impacts. If the market participants cannot interpret the information indicated by cash 
precisely, they would misprice the stock, resulting in anomalies in subsequent periods 
when the mispricing is corrected. 
There are recently two papers trying to explain cash-return relation through mispricing 
channel. The ideas in these two papers are quite similar: investors overreact on the 
agency problems captured by high cash holdings and underestimate the stock value, so 
buying stocks with high cash holdings will get high subsequent stock returns. The first 
paper is by Li and Luo (2016), finding that cash-return relation is heavily influenced by 
investor sentiment since the relation is more pronounced after high sentiment periods and 
that cash-return relation is stronger when limits-to-arbitrage measured by transaction 
costs, institutional ownership and idiosyncratic volatility is higher. The second paper is 
the working paper by Lam et al. (2016) who find that cash-return relation is a surrogate 
for knowing mispricing and support a mispricing channel how cash holdings and stock 
returns are correlated. First, they find that the return predictability in cash holdings is 
subsumed by accruals and profitability effects and also by net operating assets effect. 
Second, they find that the positive relation strengthens when limits to arbitrage is more 
severe, indicating that cash-return relation is stronger within firms with severe mispricing 
phenomenon.  
The above two papers, especially the latter one, contradict with Palazzo‟s paper since if 
cash can serve as a proxy for systematic risk, the predictability of cash on stock return 
should not be subsumed by any other variables. Therefore, whether returns on high cash 
holdings are compensation of systematic risk is actually in debate. However there are 
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very few papers to dissect the cash-return relation in the existing literature. Whether cash-
return relation is risk induced is still an open empirical question. This paper tries to fill 
this gap by exploring the ability of cash to serve as a risk proxy using a systematic way 
that researchers have developed.  
The controversy about whether it is the risk or the equity characteristics that explains 
expected returns for a specific anomaly has been studied since 1990s. For example, 
Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that it is the size and book-to-market characteristics 
rather than the loadings on SMB and HML that affect expected returns. Davis et al. (2000) 
find that risk factors explain expected returns better than characteristics when the sample 
periods is large and their test covers period from 1926 to 1997, compared to that of 
Daniel and Titman‟s (1997) which covers from 1963 to 1997. Core et al. (2008) test 
whether the accruals quality is a priced risk factor. Mohanram et al. (2009) test whether 
PIN factor is priced. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) test whether the accrual anomaly is because 
of risk or mispricing. The methodologies used to test whether a factor is a risk factor are 
quite mature and systematic.  
Following these papers, I use several common used methods to test whether CASH can 
serve as a risk proxy in explaining the cross sectional variations of stock returns. First, I 
construct the cash factor, LMS (large amount minus small amount), by taking a long 
position on firms with large amount of cash holdings and taking a short position on firms 
with small amount of cash holdings. The mean monthly time-series premium for the LMS 
of 0.27% and is statistically different from zero with a significance level of 95%. 
Then I use a two-stage cross sectional regression method (2SCSR).  In the first stage, it 
estimates factor betas and in the second stage, estimates the factor risk premiums. Under 
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the rational factor pricing explanation of cash holding anomaly, expected returns are 
determined by a stock‟s cash factor loadings. If cash affects stock returns because of 
systematic risk it captures, the risk premium on cash factor loadings should be positive 
and significant. However, it is found that the coefficient on LMS loadings is positive but 
is not significant. 
In addition to the 2SCSR tests, I also use several other approaches that are used in the 
literature. One such test is to examine whether LMS can predict future GDP growth. This 
methodology have been used by Chen (1991), Liew and Vassalou (2000), Chordia and 
Shivakumar (2006) and Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) to test whether the Fama–French 
factors, price momentum and PIN are proxies for risk factors. Since GDP growth 
contains information of investment opportunities of the whole economy, if a risk factor 
represents the premium on systematic risk, i.e., compensation on the risk to the whole 
economy rather than some particular firms or industries, it should have a positive 
association with future GDP growth rate. However, in the context of this paper, the 
results show that there‟s no such association between LMS and GDP growth rate. 
Then, I test whether LMS or LMS loadings affect the expected costs of capital. Compare 
with subsequent realized stock returns, ex-ante expected costs of capital are estimated 
using existing accounting information. Since ex-ante costs of capital have shown to be 
positively related to risk, correlation between LMS or LMS loadings and ex-ante costs of 
equity is a necessary condition to conclude that LMS and LMS loadings reflect 
systematic risk. Again, I couldn‟t find empirical evidence of this. 
At last, I test whether there are supports of the mispricing explanation of cash-return 
relation. I first test the trading behavior of institutions pre-anomaly of cash and find that 
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institution investors tend to hold more shares of companies whose cash holdings intend to 
be high in the next period. Then I compare return spread by cash between portfolio with 
stocks held by more institutional investors and portfolio with stocks held by less 
institutional investors. It is found that return spread by cash in firms with more 
institutional ownerships is lower than that in firms with less institutional ownerships, 
suggesting that the return spread by cash is due to limited attention of investors on cash 
information, supporting the mispricing explanation. 
Overall, I interpret these results shown in this paper as documenting that based on the 
tests of rational asset pricing framework, cash cannot serve as a proxy of systematic risk. 
This paper shed lights on the literature of cash anomaly. The topic on how cash holdings 
affect expected returns has drawn considerable attentions in the past several years. Excess 
cash holdings (Simutin, 2010), the level of cash holdings (Palazzo, 2012) and the change 
in cash holdings (Sodjahin, 2013) are found to have a positive relation with expected 
stock returns. Specifically, Simutin (2010) find that as a proxy for unexpected investment 
growth option, excess cash is positively associated with expected returns. Palazzo (2012) 
develops a rational model to show the positive relation between cash holdings and 
expected returns based on its relation with cash flow risk. Sodjahin (2013) argues that the 
change in cash holding is a proxy of the coming investment opportunity and the high 
return is a compensation for the risk that accompanies the new investment opportunity. 
Although they try to explain cash-return relation from a perspective of rational asset 
pricing theory that firms hold cash for future investment options, they didn‟t provide 
solid evidence on this with reasonable asset pricing methods. What‟s more, there are 
papers shown that cash-return relation is caused by investors‟ misinterpretation of the 
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information contained in cash holdings (Li and Luo 2016, Lam et al. 2016). In this study, 
I explore in further by asking whether there is a pervasive systematic factor with respect 
to cash holdings directly associated with return variability. 
In the next section, I describe the sample and replicate table 4 and table 5 in Palazzo‟s 
paper. Section 3 reports the construction of LMS factor and its correlation with existing 
Fama and French factors. Section 4 shows the results of two-stage cross sectional 
regressions. Section 5 tests the correlation between cash and future GDP growth. Section 
6 reports the relation between ex-ante cost of equity and LMS/LMS loading. Section 7 
tests the possible mispricing explanation of cash-return relation. Section 8 concludes. 
2. Replication and extension of Palazzo’s paper 
2.1 Data and variables 
Stock price, stock return and shares of common outstanding are taken from Center for 
Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) monthly return file; quarterly financial data are 
obtained from Compustat Quarterly; monthly risk-free interest rate, the three Fama 
French factors (RM-RF, SMB, and HML) and momentum factor returns (UMD) are gotten 
through Kenneth French‟s website. The sample is based on all NYSE/AMEX and 
NASDAQ firms with available data from both CRSP and Compustat quarterly with a 
period from July 1972 to December 2015. I filter and merge the datasets following the 
criteria below, most of which is borrowed from Palazzo‟s paper (Plazzo, 2012): 1) the 
data from CRSP and Compustat Quarterly are merged by PERMNO; 2) the first six digits 
of Compustat Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) must 
be same with the first six digits of the CRSP CUSIP code or the CRSP name CUSIP 
(NCUSIP) code; 3) only ordinary common shares (share codes 10 and 11 in CRSP) are 
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considered; 4) observations related to suspended, halted, or non-listed shares (exchange 
codes lower than 1 and higher than 3 are excluded; 5) stocks in the sample should have 
reported returns for at least 24 months in 5 years prior to portfolio formation; 6) utility 
firms (SIC codes between 4900 and 4949) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 
and 6999) are excluded; 7) observations with a negative book-to-market ratio or a 
negative cash-to-assets ratio are excluded from the sample. 
For the measurements, cash holding is calculated as cash and short term investments 
(item CHE) over total assets (item AT). Size is the market value of stock at portfolio 
formation. Book equity is stockholder‟s equity (item SEQQ), or common equity (item 
CEQQ) plus preferred stock par value (item PSTKQ), or asset (item ATQ) minus 
liabilities (item LTQ)) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit(item 
TXDITCQ) minus the book value of preferred stock (item PSTKRQ, or PSTKQ if 
PSTKRQ is not available). The book to-market ratio is calculated by dividing book 
equity by market capitalization measured at portfolio formation. Return is adjusted using 
delisting return on delisting day.  
2.2 Replication of Palazzo’s paper 
To make this study comparable to Palazzo‟s, in this section, I replicate the results of the 
portfolio characteristics and spread of return by one-way sort (table 3 and table 4) in his 
paper. Palazzo (2012) shows that cash holdings could explain the cross sectional 
variation in excess return that cannot be explained by existing models such as classic 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Fama and French (1992) three factor model.  
In particular, in table 3, Palazzo uses data over the periods from July 1972 to December 
2009 and classifies the sample into 10 deciles in each month based on cash over total 
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assets. In table 4, for portfolio construction, instead of rebalancing annually with annual 
accounting data, he constructs the portfolios based on quarterly accounting data. 
Following his paper, I use the quarterly accounting data available in month t in portfolio 
sorts starting at time t+i+1 if there has been an earnings announcement (item RDQ) in 
month t+i. For example, the first fiscal quarterly financial report (end in March) is 
announced on May 20, year t, then these data are used to form portfolios starting from 
June, year t. I don‟t require i to be 1, 2 or 3 in order to make the sample more continuous 
in monthly frequency. For example, the first fiscal quarterly financial report (end in 
March) is announced on July 20, year t, then these data are used to form portfolios 
starting from August, year t, although the interval between March to August is 5 months. 
If RDQ is missing, I use the accounting data from the latest fiscal quarter that at least six 
months prior to portfolio formation. If financial reports of two consecutive quarters are 
announced in the same month, I will use the latest quarter to sort the portfolio. For 
example, the financial reports of the first and second fiscal quarter in year t are 
announced on July 5, year t and July 20, year t, then I‟ll use the information of the second 
quarter to sort the portfolio which starts in August, year t. 
I first show the results based on a period exactly same with Palazzo‟s, i.e. from July 1972 
to December 2009. Then I extend the sample period to 2015 since more data are available 
now and moreover this also could test the robustness and pervasiveness of the positive 
relation between return and cash holdings.  
[Insert table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents the results of the summary statistics of firm characteristics. Columns 
from (1) to (5) are over period from July 1972 to December 2009. Compared to Palazzo‟s 
10 
 
paper, all the statistics are quite similar. In particular, book to market ratio, market value 
are decreasing with cash holdings, while post-rank market beta is increasing with cash 
holdings. This is also consistent with intuition that firms with more growth options, 
smaller size and more risk exposure tend to hold more cash. Columns from (6) to (10) 
report the summary over period from July 1972 to December 2015. The correlations 
between cash and book to market ratio, market value, post-rank beta are identical across 
these two different time windows.  
[Insert table 2 here] 
Table 2 presents the results of the difference in excess and risk adjusted returns between 
top and bottom deciles for both the equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios. 
Panel A reports the results over period from July 1972 to December 2009. Panel A.1, A.2 
and A.3 report excess return, excess returns adjusted by CAPM model and excess return 
adjusted by Fama and French (1992) three factor model respectively.  
The results are similar to Palazzo‟s paper in all respects. Firstly, the difference in excess 
returns, excess return adjusted by CAPM model and excess return adjusted by Fama and 
French (1992) three factor model between the top and bottom cash-to-assets deciles are 
all positive. For equally weighted portfolios, all return spreads are statistically significant, 
but for value weighted portfolios, only Fama French three-factor adjusted return spread is 
statistically significant. The magnitudes are also similar to his paper. For example, panel 
A.1 shows that the excess return is 0.796% per month for equally weighted and 0.331% 
for value weighted, comparable to 0.69% and 0.38% respectively in palazzo‟s paper. 
Secondly, differences in loadings on market size, growth options which is reported in 
panel A.3 are positive and significantly different from zero for both the equally weighted 
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and the value-weighted portfolios. When the sample is extended to December 2015, all 
results remain similar. 
3. Construction and summary statistics for the factor returns 
So far, I have replicated palazzo‟s paper and shown that the results are quite similar to 
theirs‟, indicating that the following results are comparable and suggestive to his 
arguments. In this section, I construct the cash factor using the same sample obtained in 
the section 2. 
3.1 The construction of LMS 
Following the construction approach of Fama and French three factors, I create the cash-
based factor which I call LMS (large amount minus small amount) as a zero-investment 
factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is formed based on cash and size groups via 
independent sorts. In particular, in each month, all stocks with non-missing size, non-
missing cash and positive book equity value are assigned into two size groups (S or B) 
based on whether the value of size is smaller or larger than the median value of their 
NYSE breakpoints. Also in each month, all stocks are sorted independently into three 
cash portfolios (S, M, or L) based on the 30% and 70% NYSE breakpoints. Taking 
intersections of two size portfolios and three cash portfolios, I form six portfolios which 
are called S/S, S/M, S/L, B/S, B/M, and B/L. The value-weighted monthly returns of 
these six portfolios are calculated for each month. The cash factor „LMS‟ (large amount-
small amount) is the difference between the weighted average of the returns on the two 
large amounts of cash portfolios (S/L and B/L) and the equal-weighted average of the 
returns on the two small amounts of cash portfolios (S/S and B/S): (S/L + B/L)/2+ (S/S + 
B/S)/2. 
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[Insert table 3 here] 
3.2 Summary statistics of LMS and Fama and French factors 
The summary statistics of Fama French factors and cash factor is reported in panel A of 
table 3. The sample consists of 522 monthly time-series return over period of July 1972 
to December 2015. The mean monthly time-series return to LMS is 0.27%, indicating a 
mean annual risk premium of about 3.24%. The return to LMS is different from zero with 
a significance level of 95%. The modest significance of risk premium does not provide 
strong evidence that cash is priced (Shanken and Weinstein, 2006). 
Panel B of Table 3 reports the correlations between Fama French 5 factors, momentum 
factor and cash factor. The correlation table shows that the cash factor, i.e. LMS is 
positively related to market risk factor and size factor and negatively correlated with 
market to book ratio factor, investment factor and profitability factor. As for the 
magnitude, LMS is highly correlated with HML(r=-0.633) and RMW (r=-0.570), 
modestly correlated with SMB and CMA, and have low correlations with market risk 
premium(r=0.208) and UMD (r=0.123).  
3.3 Time-series regression of LMS on Fama and French factors 
Note that statistically significant spreads on cash are not sufficient evidence that cash is a 
priced risk factor since LMS may be subsumed by the existing Fama–French risk factors. 
Therefore, I test whether LMS is subsumed by regressing LMS on Fama and French 3 
factors, 4 factors and 5 factors respectively. The idea is that if LMS can be fully 
explained by other factors, the estimated intercept which represents the unexplained part 
should be insignificant. Specifically, the model is as following:  
                                                 . 
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The results are reported in Panel C, table 3. Overall, Panel C provides several 
implications. First, the intercept is significant in all model specifications, suggesting LMS 
can explain the variation in stock return that cannot be captured by existing factors. 
Second, UMD has little to do with LMS since the coefficient of UMD is insignificant and 
the adjusted R-square doesn‟t increase at all when UMD is augmented. Third, LMS is 
highly correlated with HML and RMW both in magnitude and in significance. This is 
consistent with the argument from corporate perspective, that, firms higher investment 
opportunity (lower book to market ratio), less profitability (more financial constraints) 
tend to hold more cash. Fourth, the explanation power increased from 44.4% of 
regression of LMS on Fama and French 3 factors to 60.7% of regression of LMS on 
Fama and French 5 factors.  
3.4 Factor loadings in three-factor and five-factor asset-pricing models 
From the last subsection, we know that LMS has little correlation to do with UMD, so in 
the rest tests, I use Fama and French 3 factor model and 5 factor model instead of the four 
factor model.  
In this subsection, I investigate the effects of cash on contemporaneous equity returns, as 
manifest in the factor loadings and explanatory power of three-factor (the market risk 
premium, size premium, and value premium) and five-factor (the market risk premium, 
size premium, value premium, profitability premium and investment premium) asset-
pricing models augmented with LMS. The models are illustrated as below: 
             (         )                       
                                                        . 
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I begin by estimating the above two models for each of the 10565 firms with at least 18 
monthly returns between July 1972 and December 2015. Then I take means of coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics for the 10565 regressions. If LMS proxy for new factor premium, 
it should have a significant effect on explaining the variations in returns. The coefficient 
of LMS should be positive and significant, and the explanatory power should be 
enhanced after LMS is augmented into these models.  
[Insert table 4 here] 
Table 4 presents the estimates of time-series regressions of stock excess returns on 
contemporaneous factor returns on firm level. Column (1) reports the estimates of Fama 
and French three-factor model. Column (3) reports the estimates of Fama and French 
five-factor model. Column (2) and column (4) are results when LMS is included.  
The estimates under all model specifications show that all the Fama French factor 
loadings are significant at 99% level. For explanatory power, column (1) and column (3) 
show that the three factors and five factors explain an average of 19.2% and 23% of the 
total variation in the sample firms‟ excess returns. The rest columns report the mean 
coefficient estimates and statistics for regressions when LMS is included. Column (2) 
shows that the coefficient of LMS is negative with t-statistics of -1.35. Column (4) shows 
that the coefficient of LMS is negative with t-statistics of -2.4. What‟s more, the 
coefficients of other factors do not change much, and for explanatory power, when LMS 
is included, the figure of both models increases by around 2%. All these indicate LMS 
provides limited information in explaining stock return. 
4. The two-stage cross-sectional regression (2SCSR) 
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So far, I have shown that the cash premium „LMS‟ is positive and marginally significant; 
LMS is not subsumed to other factors; LMS have limited power in explaining the 
variations in stock return time serially. In this section, I test whether the LMS is a priced 
risk factor using a two-stage cross-sectional regression approach (2SCSR). This method 
has been applied by previous papers to test whether a candidate variable is a priced risk 
factor. For example, Daniel and Titman (1997) use this method to test whether size and 
book to market ratio are priced; Core and Guay (2008) use this approach to test whether 
accrual quality is priced; Mohanram et al. (2009) use this approach to test whether PIN is 
priced. To apply this method, I first estimate factor loadings for LMS and other risk 
factors. Then I run a cross-sectional regression of returns on factor loadings to test 
whether the factor loadings can predict returns. Since Fama and French (1992) show that 
the estimated factor loadings for individual stocks are noisy, and it will cause bias if use 
noisy factor loadings in Fama–Macbeth regression. To mitigate this concern, following 
previous studies (Khan, 2008), I do the tests at portfolio level instead of firm level. 
4.1 The first stage: estimate factor loadings 
In the first stage, I estimate factor loading by regression the excess return of a portfolio 
on Fama and French factors and LMS. LMS is defined as the equally weighted average of 
the value-weighted hedge returns (high CASH–low CASH) for two size groups. I 
conduct this analysis both for the Fama–French 3-factor model (Rm–Rf, SMB, HML) 
augmented with LMS, as well as for the Fama–French 5-factor model (Rm–Rf, SMB, 
HML, RMW, CMA) augmented with LMS. Specifically, the models are shown below. 
                                                                
         ; 
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                                    . 
[Insert table 5 here] 
Table 5 reports the average estimates of the coefficients and their t-statistics, along with 
the adjusted R
2
. In a paper with similar research methodology, Core and Guay (2008) 
claim that if the portfolios do not generate enough cross sectional variations in the factor 
to be tested, it would have systematically bias and show lower statistical power when 
testing whether the factor is a priced risk factor. To address this concern, I use four 
different sets of portfolios to make sure the results are robust: 9 size-cash groups (3*3), 
10 size groups, 30 size-cash groups (10*3), and finally 27 size-cash-LMS groups (3*3*3). 
9 size-cash groups are sorted based on the P30 and P70 NYSE breakpoints of size and 
cash. 10 size groups are sorted based on the NYSE decile breakpoints of size. 30 size-
cash groups are based on NYSE decile breakpoints of size and the P30 and P70 NYSE 
breakpoints of cash. For 27 size-cash-lms groups, 9 size-cash groups are firstly sorted 
based on the P30 and P70 NYSE breakpoints of size and cash. Then each size-cash group 
is further sorted by the value of P30 and P70 of firm-level LMS loadings. All size groups 
and cash groups are sorted independently. Then for each portfolio, I compute the value 
weighted return within each month, getting 522 monthly returns over the period of July 
1972 to December 2015. 
Panel A of table 5 presents summary results of the time-series regressing of excess stock 
returns on Fama and French 3 factors and LMS at portfolio level. The first and second 
columns of the table present the average of estimates of 9 time-series regressions for the 
9-size-cash portfolio. Similarly, the third and fourth columns are for the 10-size portfolio; 
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the fifth and sixth columns are for 30-size-cash portfolio; the last two columns are for the 
27-Size-Cash-LMS portfolio. The results show that both the magnitude and significance 
of the coefficients of FF factors are consistent with previous studies. The average 
loadings on the market risk premium, size premium and value premium is around 1, 0.6 
and 0.2 respectively for all portfolio classifications. When LMS is added to the models, 
the coefficients of market factor and size factor are almost the same as estimates of 
models without LMS while the coefficient of HML changes a lot. This is consistent with 
previous results of this paper that LMS has a high correlation with HML, so LMS and 
HML explain overlapping variations in stock return. The coefficient of LMS is negative 
and statistically significant only for 10-size portfolio and 30-size-cash portfolio, 
indicating cash affects stock return strongly conditional on size. The Fama and French 
factors explain an average of 88%, 91%, 81% and 77% of the time-series return variation 
in the four sets of portfolio returns. LMS factor contribute an increase in the explanatory 
power of the models with a range from 0.2% to 4.7%. Panel B of table 5 reports summary 
results of regressions of excess stock return on Fama and French 5 factors and LMS 
factor at portfolio level. From this table, we get similar information as for LMS. 
4.2 The second stage: Fama-Macbeth regressions 
In the second stage, I conduct monthly Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional 
regressions of value weighted excess returns on factor loadings to ascertain whether LMS 
factor loadings predict returns within each of the four sets of portfolios. The model as 
below is estimated over period from July 1972 to December 2015: 
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅-    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅=                                 +             . 
[Insert table 6 here] 
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The cross-sectional regressions are run for each of the 522 months from July 1972 to 
December 2015, and the parameters are averaged and t-statistics estimated using the 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Table 6 presents Fama Macbeth regression results. 
Including different Fama-French factors produces similar results for different. To save 
place, I tabulated only the results using the Fama-French 3-factor model (Rm-Rf, SMB, 
and HML) augmented with LMS. To show consistence over the tests, in the following 
tests, I also show estimates of regressions on the three Fama–French factors. To make 
sure the empirical approach correct, I replicate Table V, Petkova (2006) first. The first 
two rows of Panel A of Table 6 present results of the second stage in Petkova‟s (2006) 
with a sample period of July 1963 to December 2001 and the second two rows show my 
replication over the same period. The results are quite similar in that, the market loading 
is negative and marginally significant, the size (SMB) loading is positive but insignificant, 
and the book-to-market (HML) loading is positive and significant. This is also consistent 
with the literature. 
Panels from B to E of Table 6 present the second stage results for 4 sets of portfolios: 9 
size-cash portfolios, 10 size portfolios, 30 size-cash portfolios, 27 size-cash-
LMS_loading portfolios. In each panel, the estimates for Fama–French 3-factor model 
are presented in the first two rows, followed by the results for Fama–French 3-factor 
model augmented with LMS. If LMS were a risk factor, it would be expected to have a 
positive coefficient. However, the estimated coefficients on the LMS beta are negative 
and not statistically significant from zero in all of the models. The estimated coefficients 
on the market are positive and significant when portfolios are sorted based on size and 
cash, indicating that size-cash portfolios create the most variation in market risk premium. 
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This is also consistent with table 1 that cash holdings are increasing when firm risk 
increases. The coefficients on size and book-to-market factor betas are insignificant in 
these specifications. Previous studies show that the coefficient on HML beta is positive, 
but in this paper, it is not the case, which may because of the variation in the beta 
loadings of HML factor is not significant since portfolios are not sorted based on book-
to-market ratio in this paper. 
Overall, the results from the two-stage cross-sectional regressions are consistent with 
previous tables/studies and cast doubt on whether LMS is a priced risk factor. 
5. LMS and Future GDP growth rate 
In this section, I will discuss the relation between LMS and GDP growth rate. Chen 
(1991) shows that in intertemporal market equilibrium, the state variables that are priced 
are those that can forecast changes in the investment and consumption opportunity sets. 
The predictive power of the proposed new factor on future GDP growth has been used by 
various scholars to test whether there is a risk effect of cash on stock returns. For 
example, Liew and Vassalou (2000) use this approach to examine whether there is low 
value risk and small size risk; Chordia and Shivakumar (2006) use this approach to 
evident earnings momentum is a risk factor; Mohanram(2009) use this approach to 
examine whether PIN is a priced risk factor. In this paper, if LMS is a risk factor in an 
inter-temporal asset-pricing model such as Merton (1973), it would have a positive 
relation with GDP growth rate. 
Following Chen (1991) and Liew and Vassalou (2000), I regress future GDP growth on 
lagged values of the Fama–French factors as well as LMS. The specific model is shown 
below: 
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                        .  
The dependent variable is the continuously compounded growth in real GDP over months 
from t+1 to t+12 and the explanatory variables include the value-weighted excess market 
return(Rm-Rf), SMB, HML, UMD and LMS, all of which are compounded over months t-
11 to t. GDP data is available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Since data of 
GDP growth rates are available at quarterly frequency, consecutive annual growth rates 
have three overlapping quarters, inducing serial correlation in the residuals of our 
regressions. To address this concern, I use the Newey and West (1987) estimator and set 
the parameter q equal to three. 
[Insert table 7 here] 
Table 7 presents the results. Because GDP growth rates are observed at quarterly 
frequencies, the regressions use quarterly data. The time series sample is constituted with 
173 quarters over period December 1972 to December 2015. Panel A reports the 
replication results of table 6, Mohanram et al. (2009) over period December 1984 to 
December 2002. I get very similar results to theirs that only the coefficient of HML is 
significantly different from zero. Panels from B to E show the results using four different 
portfolios with LMS included in the model. Under all sample sets, I find that the 
coefficients on LMS are positive but not significant. Further, the adjusted-R
2
 of the 
regression is only about -0.5% when LMS is included by itself. FF factors can explain 
around 12% variations in GDP growth rate and this figure increases by only about 1% 
when LMS is augmented. These results suggest that LMS fails a macro-economic test of 
whether it is a risk factor. 
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6. LMS and ex-ante expected cost of equity 
Another possible way to assess whether LMS is a priced risk factor is to examine whether 
a higher LMS is associated with a higher ex ante cost of capital (i.e., implied cost of 
capital, ICOE). Because of their nature as proxies for expected returns, ICOE can be used 
as the risk-related compensation. If the relation between LMS and future return is 
attributable to market mispricing, then the relation between LMS and the ICOE would 
not be pronounced. On the contrary, if LMS is a priced risk factor, then we would expect 
a higher LMS to be associated with higher ICOE. In particular, I use the following model 
to conduct the firm-level regressions of ante cost of capital measures on CASH and the 
control variables: 
                                                           , 
where RP represents the risk premium, calculated as ICOE minus risk free rate; Beta 
represents the market risk loadings calculated over period from July 1972 to December 
2015; LSIZE is calculated as the natural log of market value; LBM is the natural log of 
book to market ratio; LDM is the natural log of 1 plus long-term debt over market value; 
CASH is cash and short-term investments over total assets.  
Following Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model, I estimate ICOE with the 
following model: 
     √   
    
  
           , 
Where   
 
 
      
    
  
 and    
         
    
, eps1 and eps2 are consensus estimates of 
1-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead annual eps, g2 is the average of short-term growth rate 
(eps2/eps1-1), dps1 is the estimated dividend in the next period assuming historical payout 
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and g is the estimate of the long run economy-wide growth rate. (γ-1) is set as Rf -3%, 
where Rf is the yield on 10-year notes. 
Since the estimated ICOE is in an annually frequency, I do this tests using annual data. 
The annual accounting data is obtained from compustat annual industrial. EPSs are 
obtained from I/B/E/S Summary. 10-year notes yield is obtained from CRSP Index. After 
merging all the variables together, I keep only firms that are used in previous tests in 
order to make the sample firms consistent in all tests. The final sample is constructed 
with 70805 firm-year observations from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 2015. The 
accounting variables are all winsorized at 1% and 99% level in each fiscal year. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the mean value of key variables. The mean value of RP, Beta, 
LSIZE, LDM, LBM and CASH is around 15.59%, 1.157, 5.94, 0.234, -0.685 and 0.145 
respectively. Panel B shows the correlations between these variables. It is shown that RP 
is positively related to Beta, long-term leverage, book to market ratio, and negatively 
related to size and cash. Panel C shows the estimates of Fama Macbeth regression. The 
coefficient of CASH is negative and is not significantly different from zero, indicating 
that there is no association between CASH and ICOE. The inconsistent relationship 
between CASH and ex-ante risk provide extra evidence that CASH cannot be considered 
a reliable proxy of systematic risk. As for the coefficients of other variables, market beta, 
book to market ratio, long-term debt increase the cost of equity, while size decreases it. 
This is consistent with previous studies (Mohanram, 2009), and also consistent with the 
intuition that firms with higher systematic risk, lower growth options, higher leverage 
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tend to have higher costs of equity, while firms with bigger size tend to have lower costs 
of equity.  
6.1 LMS loadings and ex-ante expected cost of equity 
Since LMS loading represents the risk exposure to LMS, and ex-ante costs of equity is 
also proxy for the expected risk, we should see a positive correlation between LMS 
loading and ex-ante costs of equity if LMS is the risk compensation on large amount of 
cash. To test this argument, I run the cross-sectional Fama Macbeth regressions following 
the model as: 
                                                  
where the independent variables are firm-level factor loadings calculated over full sample 
period from July 1972 to December 2015 for firms with at least 18 months during this 
period. 
[Insert table 9 here] 
Panel A, table 9 presents the correlation between RP and the factor loadings, suggesting a 
positive correlation of RP and the factor loadings. Panel B, table 9 reports the estimates 
of the Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regression. The coefficients of market loading, 
SMB loading and HML loading is positive and significant, while the coefficient of LMS 
loading is not significant. This test does not support that LMS is a risk factor, indicating 
that cash-return relation is not because of systematic risk captured by cash. And high cash 
level cannot suggest high systematic risk. 
7 The potential Mispricing Explanation of Cash-return Relation 
So far, I have provided evidence that cash-return relation is not due to the systematic risk 
related to cash holdings. In this chapter, I will explore the potential behavior explanation. 
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As mentioned, the cash-return relation may due to the limited attention of investors on 
cash information. The investors may interpret firms with higher cash holdings as firms 
with more agency problems since managers in firms with more agency problems tend to 
hold more cash to get private perquisites. In this case investors tend to undervalue the 
stock prices of firms with more cash holdings. And hence stocks of firms with more cash 
holdings tend to get higher subsequent return. I‟ll use two methods to provide evidences 
of mispricing explanation by using institutional investors as sophisticated investors. The 
first is to test the trading behaviour of institutions in relation to cash. The second is to test 
the differences in return spread by cash between firms with more institutional investors 
and less institutional investors. 
7.1 Trading Behaviour of Institutions pre-anomaly of Cash 
Institutional investors are proved to be sophisticated investors. Sophisticated investors 
have the ability to predict stock return and they would sell a stock if it is overpriced and 
buy it if it gets undervalued. So I first test whether there are more institutional investors 
invest on long leg of pre-anomaly portfolios. If institutional investors increased before 
cash anomalies are formed, the cash holding anomaly is more likely to be because of the 
mispricing effect. In this test, two measures of institutional investors are considered. The 
first is the number of institutional investors. The second is the number of shares held by 
institutional investors. The data of institutional investors are available at quarterly 
frequency and are obtained in file s34 in Thomson Reuters.  
[Insert table 10 here] 
Table 10 reports the results of the change of institutions pre-anomaly. Panel A is the 
summary statistics of institutions and change in institutions. It‟s shown that averagely 
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there are around 83 institution investors per firm. The shares held by institutions account 
for around 41% of the total shares. Panel B shows the changes in institutional investors 
for cash holding anomaly stocks. I first sort the sample into three portfolios based on cash 
over total assets in quarter q. Then I calculate the change in institutions from the 
beginning of quarter q to the end of quarter q. The zero-investments on long in high cash 
portfolio and short in low cash portfolio earn an average return of 0.6%. Both change in 
number of institutions and change in shares of institutions show monotonically 
decreasing from the long leg of cash portfolio to short leg of cash portfolio, suggesting 
that the institutions tend to invest more on high cash portfolio to get higher subsequent 
return. 
7.2 Comparison of Return Spread by Cash between HIO and LIO 
If the cash prediction of returns is due to the mispricing caused by investors‟ limited 
attention of the cash implications on firm performance, it should be expected that there 
would be less cash mispricing for firms held by more institutional investors who are more 
informed and sophisticated in reading accounting information. This mechanism has been 
used to test the accrual mispricing due to investors‟ limited attention by Collins, Gong 
and Hribar (2003). I use institutional ownership to proxy for institution investors. I divide 
the sample into 25 (5*5) portfolios based on cash and institutional ownership and aim to 
find the differences in abnormal returns spread by cash between high institutional 
investor group (i.e., HIO) and low institutional investor group (i.e., LIO).  
[Insert table 11 here] 
Table 11 reports the results showing how institutional investors affect the return spread 
across cash holding quintiles. LIO indicates the group with lowest quintile of institutional 
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investors. MIO indicates the group with medium quintile of institutional investors. HIO 
indicates the group with highest quintile of institutional investors. The abnormal returns 
include excess return, excess return adjusted by market risk and excess return adjusted by 
Fama French 3 factors. In the LIO, these three variables get values of 1.096%, 0.992% 
and 1.189% respectively with significance at 99% level. While in the HIO, they are 
0.314%, 0.079% and 0.560% and are not statistically significant. The values in MIO are 
in between the respective values in HIO and LIO. Panel D shows the differences in 
abnormal return spread by cash between HIO and LIO. The differences are all 
statistically significant; indicating that return spread by cash in firms with more 
institutional ownerships is lower than that in firms with less institutional ownerships. 
These results suggest that the return spread by cash is due to a mispricing effect due to 
limited attention of investors on cash information. 
8 Conclusion 
This paper tries to test whether cash-return relation is caused by systematic risk. Palazzo 
(2012) finds a positive correlation between cash and equity return. He claims that cash 
holdings have a link with systematic risk, and therefore, firms with more cash have 
higher stock return for compensation on the systematic risk embedded within them. This 
argument is interpreted in the paper of Simutin(2010) that cash could serve as a proxy of 
systematic risk. However, none of them empirically verify this argument with the 
methodology used in the literature. Recently, there are papers studying the cash-return 
relation from behaviour finance perspective, finding evidence supporting a mispricing 
explanation story and also casting doubt on whether the relation between cash and return 
really exists. So this paper tries to follow the systematic methodology in the literature to 
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test whether cash could be proxy for systemic risk in explaining the variations in stock 
returns. First, the two-stage cross-sectional regression show that LMS loading is not 
priced. Second, LMS is not correlated with the macro-economy growth rate, which is not 
consistent with the intertemporal asset pricing theory. Third, both cash and LMS loading 
are not associated with the implied costs of equity, which typically have a positive 
correlation with systematic risk. I further explore the potential mispricing explanation and 
find supporting evidences. First, it is found that sophisticated investors tend to buy in 
more stocks in firms with more cash than stocks in firms with less cash, consistent with 
the argument that sophisticated investors get can earn higher return by recognizing 
mispriced stocks. Second, it is found that the cash-return relation in firms with more 
sophisticated investors are less pronounced than in firms with less sophisticated investors, 
consistent with the view that sophisticated investors help correct mispricing effect.  
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Table 1 Characteristics of the ten cash-to-assets portfolios 
This table reports the average and median value (in the squared brackets) of the time 
series value of cross sectional mean values of firm characteristics across the ten portfolios 
which are rebalanced monthly based on cash over total assets. Column (1) to column (5) 
is summary statistics over periods from July 1972 to December 2009, which is the same 
as the time window in Palazzo‟s paper. Column (6) to column (10) is the statistics of the 
period from July 1972 to December 2015. For the portfolio construction, I use the 
quarterly accounting data available in month t in portfolio sorts starting at time t+i+1 if 
there has been an earnings announcement (item RDQ) in month t+i. N is the average firm 
number contained in each portfolio. CAR is cash over total assets. Market size is the 
market value of stock at portfolio formation. Book equity is stockholder‟s equity (item 
SEQQ), or common equity (item CEQQ) plus preferred stock par value (item PSTKQ), 
or asset (item ATQ) minus liabilities (item LTQ)) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit(item TXDITCQ) minus the book value of preferred stock (item 
PSTKRQ, or PSTKQ if PSTKRQ is not available). The BM (book to-market ratio) is 
calculated by dividing book equity by market capitalization measured at portfolio 
formation. Beta is the post-rank beta which is calculated with full period sample. Beta is 
the post-rank beta following Fama and French (1992).  
Portfolio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Palazzo‟s paper: Jul. 1972 to Dec. 2009  My statistics: Jul. 1972 to Dec. 2015 
N CAR BM Market Size Beta  N CAR BM Market Size Beta 
1 244 0.00 1.13 832.79 1.01  234 0.00 1.09 1132.63 1.02 
  0.00 1.00 587.62 0.97   0.00 0.98 759.53 1.02 
2 244 0.01 1.11 1320.81 1.03  234 0.01 1.07 2079.96 1.04 
  0.01 1.02 577.24 1.01   0.01 0.97 1083.30 1.04 
3 244 0.02 1.10 1525.62 1.04  234 0.03 1.05 2427.21 1.06 
  0.02 0.98 921.98 1.02   0.02 0.93 1491.52 1.05 
4 244 0.04 1.07 1415.38 1.07  234 0.04 1.02 2136.87 1.08 
  0.03 0.96 749.23 1.04   0.03 0.90 958.81 1.08 
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5 244 0.06 1.01 1430.08 1.08  234 0.07 0.97 2097.51 1.10 
  0.05 0.92 858.42 1.06   0.05 0.87 1071.79 1.11 
6 244 0.09 0.96 1581.96 1.11  234 0.10 0.91 2372.43 1.12 
  0.08 0.89 755.40 1.08   0.08 0.84 1134.17 1.12 
7 244 0.14 0.88 1274.50 1.16  234 0.15 0.84 2076.74 1.17 
  0.13 0.80 733.26 1.11   0.13 0.76 888.96 1.14 
8 244 0.21 0.82 999.07 1.20  234 0.22 0.79 1485.63 1.20 
  0.20 0.72 569.60 1.11   0.21 0.69 683.50 1.13 
9 244 0.32 0.74 885.47 1.25  234 0.33 0.71 1308.09 1.25 
  0.31 0.65 481.64 1.12   0.32 0.61 616.92 1.16 
10 244 0.55 0.66 459.47 1.28  234 0.58 0.62 762.25 1.29 
  0.59 0.60 332.78 1.16   0.60 0.56 372.24 1.26 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Equity returns and risk-adjusted returns across the ten cash-to-assets 
portfolios 
This table reports average monthly excess returns (Ret-Rf), average monthly market risk 
adjusted return (Alpha), and average monthly Fama French three-factor alphas (Alpha) of 
equal-weighed and value-weighted cash holding decile portfolios. Each month, all 
common stocks are sorted into deciles using the cash holding breakpoints of the NYSE 
stock sample. Panel A reports results within a period from July 1972 to December 2009 
which are comparable to Palazzo (2012). Panel B are the estimates within a more recent 
period that is within a period from January 1980 to December 2015, which is also the 
sample period for the later tests. The portfolios are held for one month. Returns and 
alphas are in percentage terms.  
Panel A Equity returns and risk-adjusted returns across the ten cash-to-assets portfolios 
during July 1972 to Dec. 2009 
 Equally Weighted  Value-weighted 
 CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH  CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH 
Panel A.1 Excess return 
  
  0.527 0.944 1.323 0.796  0.421 0.470 0.752 0.331 
   
  1.79 3.06 3.4 3.22  1.72 1.88 1.97 1.11 
Panel A.2 Market risk adjusted return 
      α 0.078 0.452 0.762 0.684  0.002 0.030 0.158 0.156 
   0.38 2.42 2.45 2.24  0.02 0.34 0.62 0.54 
     1.040 1.141 1.301 0.261  0.973 1.021 1.378 0.405 
      15.37 18.6 18.22 2.46  27.89 21.2 15.49 3.64 
Panel A.3 FF three factor risk adjusted return 
      α -0.346 0.120 0.857 1.203  -0.059 -0.066 0.574 0.633 
   -2.79 1.14 3.48 4.21  -0.43 -0.77 2.9 2.59 
     1.017 1.068 0.971 -0.046  1.004 1.048 1.063 0.059 
      27.84 29.26 17.79 -0.63  32.01 23.42 17.23 0.72 
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     0.888 0.940 1.290 0.402  -0.029 0.056 0.622 0.650 
      8.4 9.27 13.51 2.19  -0.37 0.84 7.63 4.48 
     0.588 0.415 -0.408 -0.996  0.113 0.159 -0.856 -0.969 
      6.74 5.28 -4.36 -6.72  1.47 2.77 -11.87 -7.77 
Panel B equity returns and risk-adjusted returns across the ten cash-to-assets portfolios 
during Jan. 1980 to Dec. 2015 
 Equally Weighted  Value-weighted 
 CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH  CH1 CH5 CH10 ∆CH 
Panel B.1 Excess return 
  
  0.592 0.965 1.330 0.737  0.470 0.578 0.806 0.336 
   
  2.2 3.47 3.77 3.27  2.12 2.54 2.35 1.26 
Panel B.2 Market risk adjusted return 
      α 0.042 0.368 0.653 0.611  -0.037 0.041 0.097 0.134 
   0.22 2.19 2.38 2.24  -0.33 0.54 0.43 0.52 
     1.054 1.143 1.296 0.242  0.971 1.027 1.358 0.387 
      17.31 20.73 20.26 2.55  30.81 23.75 16.95 3.87 
Panel B.3 FF three factor risk adjusted return 
      α -0.300 0.118 0.759 1.059  -0.095 -0.030 0.459 0.553 
   -2.54 1.29 3.5 4.08  -0.78 -0.39 2.53 2.49 
     1.016 1.055 0.972 -0.044  1.000 1.048 1.065 0.066 
      30.54 31.13 19.44 -0.66  34.88 25.96 19.02 0.88 
     0.876 0.914 1.296 0.420  -0.017 0.046 0.628 0.645 
      8.97 9.62 14.17 2.45  -0.23 0.73 8.1 4.68 
     0.593 0.393 -0.408 -1.001  0.124 0.143 -0.851 -0.975 
      7.25 5.29 -4.64 -7.21  1.69 2.57 -12.3 -8.22 
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Table 3 Time series relationship between cash factor (LMS) and Fama-French 
factors 
The table documents summary statistics (Panels A), the correlations among the three 
Fama and French (1993) factors and the cash factor (LMS) (Panels B) and time series 
relationship between LMS and Fama-French five factors computed at the monthly level 
from July 1972 to December 2015. Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market portfolio. 
SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-
market factor-mimicking portfolio. RMW is return to operating profitability factor-
mimicking portfolio. CMA is return to investment factor-mimicking portfolio. UMD is 
return to momentum factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is the return to the cash holding 
factor-mimicking portfolio. The construction of the cash holding portfolio is explained in 
the text. The returns in Panel A are shown in percentages. Panel B contains the time-
series correlations between the factor portfolios over the sample period. Figures below 
(above) the diagonal are Pearson (Spearman rank-order) correlations. Panel C presents 
the time series relationship between LMS and Fama-French five factors and also 
momentum factor. 
Panel A summary statistics 
Factor N Mean Std Dev t Value     
Rm-Rf 522 0.522 4.577 2.61     
SMB 522 0.165 3.124 1.21     
HML 522 0.368 2.986 2.81     
RMW 522 0.262 2.363 2.53     
CMA 522 0.344 1.980 3.97     
UMD 522 0.699 4.449 3.59     
LMS 522 0.274 2.884 2.17     
Panel B Correlations 
  Rm-Rf SMB HML RMW CMA UMD LMS  
mkt_rf 1 0.259 -0.330 -0.232 -0.339 -0.107 0.196  
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0147 <.0001  
SMB 0.271 1 -0.150 -0.297 -0.120 -0.014 0.164  
<.0001  0.0006 <.0001 0.006 0.7461 0.0002  
HML -0.318 -0.235 1 -0.091 0.686 -0.101 -0.536  
<.0001 <.0001  0.0371 <.0001 0.0205 <.0001  
RMW -0.256 -0.450 0.206 1 -0.153 0.149 -0.216  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001  0.0004 0.0007 <.0001  
CMA -0.389 -0.125 0.700 0.040 1 -0.002 -0.351  
<.0001 0.0043 <.0001 0.3593  0.9681 <.0001  
UMD -0.143 -0.005 -0.166 0.094 0.019 1 0.073  
0.0011 0.9162 0.0001 0.0309 0.6569  0.095  
LMS 0.208 0.357 -0.633 -0.570 -0.391 0.123 1  
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.005   
Panel C Time-series regression of Cash Factor on other factors 
Model  LMS=α+β(rm-rf)+s SMB+h HML+ m UMD+ r RMW +c CMA+εi 
Model α β s h m r c Adj. R2 (%) 
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3-factor 0.464 -0.027 0.212 -0.572    0.444 
 4.82 -1.2 6.67 -16.96     
4-factor 0.451 -0.024 0.212 -0.567 0.014   0.444 
 4.58 -1.05 6.66 -16.39 0.62    
5-factor 0.664 -0.065 0.023 -0.526  -0.579 -0.043 0.607 
 7.98 -3.31 0.82 -13.71  -15.28 -0.72  
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Firm specific regressions of contemporaneous excess return on factor 
returns 
This table reports average coefficient estimates and average R
2
 of 10491 time-series 
regressions of monthly contemporaneous firm level excess stock returns (stock return 
minus the risk-free rate) on the Fama–French factors and LMS (the cash factor). The first 
two columns are the estimates of Fama French 3 factors and cash factor, and the last two 
columns are the estimates of Fama French 5 factors and cash factor. Rm-Rf is the excess 
return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. 
HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. RMW is return to 
operating profitability factor-mimicking portfolio. CMA is return to investment factor-
mimicking portfolio. UMD is return to momentum factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is 
the return to the cash holding factor-mimicking portfolio. The data period is from July 
1972 to December 2015. The firms included in the sample need to have at least 18 
months data during the whole period. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 3 factor model augmented with LMS 5 factor model augmented with LMS 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -0.086 -2.8 -0.087 -2.65 0.123 3.25 0.101 2.49 
Rm-Rf 1.017 108.03 0.991 101.53 0.945 84.26 0.933 81.49 
SMB 1.016 73.66 0.994 71.1 0.967 63.84 0.958 62.37 
HML 0.111 6.84 0.139 7.12 0.097 4.4 0.097 4 
RMW 
  
  -0.316 -11.89 -0.310 -11.17 
CMA 
    
-0.106 -3.31 -0.095 -2.92 
LMS 
  
-0.030 -1.35 
  
-0.055 -2.4 
R
2
 0.192 0.212  0.230 
 
0.248 
 N 10565  10565  10565 10565 
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Table 5 Portfolio time-series regressions of contemporaneous excess returns on factor 
returns 
This table presents average coefficient estimates and average R
2
 of time-series regressions. Panel 
A is for regressions of monthly contemporaneous portfolio value weighted excess stock returns 
(stock return minus the risk-free rate) on the three Fama–French factors and the LMS (Cash 
factor). Panel B is for regressions of monthly contemporaneous portfolio excess stock returns 
(stock return minus the risk-free rate) on the five Fama–French factors and the LMS (Cash factor). 
The first two columns consist of 9 (3*3) size and cash portfolios and 10 size portfolios; the next 
two columns consist of 30 (10*3) size and cash portfolios, and 27 (3*3*3) size, cash and LMS 
portfolios. Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the return to size factor-
mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-mimicking portfolio. RMW is 
return to operating profitability factor-mimicking portfolio. CMA is return to investment factor-
mimicking portfolio. LMS is the return to the cash holding factor-mimicking portfolio. T-
statistics are computed based on the standard error of the portfolio-specific coefficient estimates.  
Panel A: Fama French 3 factor model augmented with cash factor 
 9 size-cash 10 size  30 size-cash 27 size-cash-lms loading 
Intercept -0.024 0.068 0.030 0.063 -0.021 0.080 -0.043 0.055 
 -0.32 1.82 1.33 2.18 -0.46 2.98 -0.92 1.11 
Rm-Rf 1.065 1.060 1.077 1.075 1.084 1.078 1.070 1.064 
 67.21 69.47 70 72.26 113.88 117.4 74.49 71.12 
SMB  0.527 0.569 0.665 0.680 0.610 0.656 0.541 0.586 
 2.92 3.16 4.51 4.61 7.27 8.01 5.33 6.03 
HML 0.181 0.067 0.119 0.078 0.214 0.089 0.204 0.083 
 1.59 1.11 2.61 1.62 3.59 2.72 2.89 1.84 
LMS  -0.199  -0.071  -0.218  -0.211 
  -1.39  -2.64  -2.84  -1.58 
R
2
 0.884 0.912 0.907 0.909 0.808 0.834 0.768 0.815 
Panel B: Fama French 5 factor model augmented with cash factor 
 9 size-cash 10 size  30 size-cash 27 size-cash-cash loading 
Intercept -0.055 0.040 0.046 0.082 -0.050 0.057 -0.078 0.024 
 -0.56 0.89 4.38 3.62 -0.83 1.99 -1.18 0.45 
Rm-Rf 1.073 1.063 1.076 1.072 1.091 1.080 1.078 1.068 
 72.11 93.39 73.94 80.89 104.41 122.73 87.16 87.29 
SMB 0.578 0.581 0.675 0.676 0.664 0.668 0.596 0.599 
 3.35 3.36 4.74 4.74 8.45 8.49 6.43 6.46 
HML 0.094 0.019 0.028 -0.001 0.120 0.035 0.113 0.032 
 0.88 0.32 0.77 -0.02 2.11 1.03 1.7 0.74 
RMW 0.114 0.031 -0.024 -0.056 0.114 0.021 0.122 0.033 
 1.1 0.46 -0.61 -1.3 1.85 0.59 1.42 0.7 
CMA 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.003 -0.004 0.016 0.010 
 0.46 0.27 0.56 0.44 0.17 -0.18 0.58 0.33 
LMS  -0.143  -0.054  -0.161  -0.153 
 
 -1.03  -2.03  -2.35  -1.14 
R
2
 0.902 0.920 0.914 0.915 0.828 0.842 0.792 0.824 
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Table 6 Cross-sectional portfolio regressions of excess returns on factor betas 
This table presents the Fama Macbeth estimates and R
2
 of cross sectional regressions of value 
weighted monthly excess returns on Fama and French (1992) three factor loadings and cash 
holding factor loadings. Panel A presents the replication of Petkova (2006)‟s estimates of 
regressing average 25 Size-BM portfolio excess returns on factor loadings.  Panel B, C and D are 
estimates based on 9 Size-Cash portfolios, 10 Size portfolios, 30 Size-Cash portfolios and 27 
Size-Cash-LMS portfolios respectively over period of July 1972 and December 2015. All the 
factor loadings are calculated with full-period data on a multivariate time-series regression of 
portfolio returns on the respective factors during the period of July 1972 and December 2015. 
bRm-Rf is the portfolio beta related to the RM_RF factor. bSMB is the portfolio beta related to the 
SMB factor. bHML is the portfolio beta related to the HML factor. bLMS is the portfolio beta related 
to the CASH factor. T statistics are based on newy-west tests.  
Panel A: 25 size and book to market portfolios 
Replication of Petkova (2006) over period July 1963 to December 2001 
   Intercept bRm-Rf bSMB bHML Adj R
2
  
Petkova's estimate  1.15 -0.65 0.16 0.44 0.71  
FM t-stat   3.3 -1.6 1.04 3.09   
My Estimate  1.020 -0.529 0.180 0.475 0.55  
FM t-stat   3.203 -1.509 1.096 2.888   
Panel B: 9 size and cash holdings portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
  Intercept bRm-Rf bSMB bHML bLMS Adj R
2
 
Estimate   -2.075 2.597 0.124 -0.387  0.71 
FM t-stat   -1.765 2.254 0.692 -1.838   
Estimate   -2.098 2.631 0.096 -0.301 0.190 0.78 
FM t-stat   -1.808 2.323 0.499 -0.909 1.312  
Panel C: 10 size portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
Estimate   -0.440 1.062 0.004 0.336  0.63 
FM t-stat   -0.589 1.422 0.016 0.660   
Estimate   -0.370 0.991 0.012 0.321 -0.248 0.71 
FM t-stat   -0.392 1.025 0.056 0.611 -0.456  
Panel D: 30(10*3) size and cash holding portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
Estimate   -0.646 1.221 0.199 -0.350  0.41 
FM t-stat   -1.129 2.133 1.199 -1.686   
Estimate   -0.920 1.523 0.099 -0.096 0.252 0.44 
FM t-stat   -1.635 2.650 0.611 -0.409 1.715  
Panel E: 30(10*3) size and cash holding portfolios 
My estimate over the period July 1972 to December 2015 
Estimate   0.833 -0.215 0.207 -0.175  0.46 
FM t-stat   1.556 -0.378 1.209 -0.727   
Estimate   0.927 -0.324 -0.353 0.160 0.274 0.52 
FM t-stat   1.835 -0.601 -1.823 1.080 1.653  
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Table 7 Future GDP Growth on Fama–French factors and the CASH factor. 
This table presents the regression coefficients from regressing real GDP growth on the 
Fama–French factors and the CASH factor. GDP growth is the future 12-month-ahead 
compounded growth rate. Rm-Rf is the excess return on the market portfolio. SMB is the 
return to size factor-mimicking portfolio. HML is the return to book-to-market factor-
mimicking portfolio. UMD is return to momentum factor-mimicking portfolio. LMS is 
the return to the cash holding factor-mimicking portfolio. All these factors are annually 
compounded from the monthly factors over month t-11 and month t. Since data on GDP 
is reported quarterly, the regressions are based on quarterly data. GDP data is obtained 
from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. Since the calculation of compounded factors 
need data of previous 11 months data. The final sample used of this test is from 
December 1972 (Q4, 1972) to December 2015 (Q4, 2015). Panel A is the replicate of 
Mohanram et al.‟s respective results over December 1984 to December 2002. Panel B is 
the main estimates of this test in this paper. Since the regressions use overlapping data, 
the t-statistics, which are reported in parentheses, are based on Newey–West standard 
errors. 
Model: GDPGrowtht+1,t+12= α +β(Rm-Rf)t-11,t+sSMB t-11,t +hHML t-11,t +mUMD t-11,t 
+lLMS t-11,t + t 
Panel A: Replicate Mohanram et al.(2009) over period December 1984 to December 
2002 
 α β s h m  Adj R2 
Fama-French 3 factor 0.148 0.204 -0.111 0.097   0.162 
 7.84 2.65 -0.83 1.32    
        
Fama-French 4 factor 0.175 0.195 -0.058 0.049 -0.157  0.231 
 15.49 2.81 -0.6 0.71 -2.2   
Panel B: My estimates over period December 1972 to December 2015 
 α β s h m l Adj R2 
Fama-French 3 factor 0.117 0.207 0.132 0.190   0.123 
 6.96 2.91 1.15 2.3    
Fama-French 4 factor 0.120 0.203 0.130 0.184 -0.018  0.118 
 5.79 2.73 0.94 1.84 -0.24   
        
LMS 0.145     0.031 -0.005 
7.3     0.4  
Fama-French 3 factor 
and LMS 
0.108 0.212 0.119 0.268  0.136 0.134 
4.7 2.83 0.83 1.71  0.82  
Fama-French 4 factor 
and LMS 
0.113 0.204 0.113 0.264 -0.042 0.152 0.133 
4.62 2.63 0.8 1.68 -0.59 0.99  
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Table 8 Regression of RP on cash 
This table presents the estimates of regressions of RP on cash and control variables. The 
sample period is from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 2015. Implied Cost of Capital 
estimates are calculated using stock prices and earnings forecasts as of the end of the 
previous year, based on the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) OJ model. Risk Premia, 
RP, are calculated from implied cost of capital estimates by subtracting out the risk free 
rate. LSIZE is calculated as the natural log of market value; LBM is the natural log of 
book to market ratio; LDM is the natural log of 1 plus long-term debt over market value; 
CASH is cash and short-term investments over total assets.  Panel A presents mean value 
of RP, beta, log of size, log of long term debt, log of book-to-market ratio and cash over 
total assets. Panel B presents the correlations of these variables. Panel C presents the 
estimates of cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regression of RP on risk factors. 
Panel A: Mean of RP and Risk Factors 
 RP(%) Beta LSIZE LDM LBM CASH 
 15.593 1.157 5.942 0.243 -0.685 0.145 
Panel B: Correlation of RP and Risk Factors 
 RP Beta LSIZE LDM LBM CASH 
RP 1 0.072 -0.314 0.197 0.190 -0.054 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Beta 0.078 1 0.036 -0.043 -0.107 0.217 
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LSIZE -0.342 0.040 1 -0.142 -0.361 0.004 
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.3339 
LDM 0.153 -0.077 -0.051 1 0.456 -0.378 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 
LBM 0.227 -0.083 -0.356 0.469 1 -0.330 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 
CASH -0.065 0.192 0.022 -0.551 -0.309 1 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
Panel C: Regression of RP and risk factors 
 Intercept Beta LSIZE LDM LBM CASH Adj R
2
 
Annual FM 20.367 1.702 -1.283 4.347 0.892 -0.399 0.159 
 26.34 12.99 -15.7 23.32 3.98 -0.91  
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Table 9 regressions of RP on risk factor loadings 
This table presents the estimates of regressions of RP on factor loadings. The sample 
period is from fiscal year 1974 to fiscal year 2015. Implied Cost of Capital estimates are 
calculated using stock prices and earnings forecasts as of the end of the previous year, 
based on the Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) OJ model. Risk Premium, RP, are 
calculated from implied cost of capital estimates by subtracting out the risk free rate. 
LMKT, LSMB, LHML, LLMS are the firm-level factor loadings with regard to market 
risk premium, SMB, HML, LMS. Thet are the coefficients estimates of regressing excess 
return on these factors over full period for firms with at least 18 months observations. 
Panel A presents the correlations between RP and factor loadings. Panel B presents the 
estimates of cross-sectional Fama-Macbeth regression of RP on risk factor loadings. 
Panel A: Correlation of RP with factor loadings  
  RP LMKT LSMB LHML LLMS   
RP 1 0.051 0.154 0.046 0.024   
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001   
LMKT 0.062 1 0.055 0.169 -0.013   
 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001 0.0005   
LSMB 0.181 0.071 1 0.059 -0.060   
 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001 <.0001   
LHML 0.074 0.140 0.091 1 0.472   
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  <.0001   
LLMS 0.007 -0.019 -0.077 0.335 1   
 0.0802 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001    
Panel B: Regression of RP on factor loadings  
 Intercept LMKT LSMB LHML LLMS Adj R
2
 N 
Annual FM 12.832 1.011 2.092 0.644 0.127 0.058 42 years 
 16.6 4.45 12.37 3.56 1.26   
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Table 10 Summary of change of institutional investments pre-anomaly 
The table reports the changes of institutional invests and the difference between long and 
short leg based on cash holdings during the calendar quarter prior to anomaly portfolio 
formation over the period of July 1980 to December 2015. Panel A presents the summary 
statistics of four institutional ownership variables including the number of institutional 
investors (#inst(q)), the percentage of institutional shares (%inst(q)), the change in the 
number of institutional shareholders (∆#inst(q-1 to q), calculated as number at the end 
divided by the number at the beginning of period minus one) and the change in 
percentage of institutional shares (∆%inst(q-1 to q), calculated as end of period 
percentage minus beginning). The institutional investor variables are winsorized at the 1% 
level in both tails. Panel B reports the changes in institutional investor base for cash 
holding anomaly strategy. The statistics of panel C are the time-series mean and t-
statistics.  
Panel A: Summary statistics for institutional ownership pre-anomaly 
 Mean Std. P25 Median P75 
#inst(q) 83.2 128.9 11.0 35.0 105.0 
%inst(q) 40.9% 29.4% 14.3% 37.2% 64.9% 
∆#inst(q-1 to q) 4.0% 21.6% -5.9% 0.0% 9.4% 
∆%inst(q-1 to q) 0.2% 5.9% -1.6% 0.0% 2.1% 
Panel B: Changes in institutional investor base for cash holding anomaly stocks 
 Che/at(q) ∆#inst(q-1 to 
q) 
∆%inst(q-1 to 
q) 
Excess 
retun(monthly) 
Long 0.40 4.77% 0.30% 1.31 
Neut 0.09 3.83% 0.12% 1.03 
Short 0.02 3.35% 0.04% 0.70 
L-S 0.38
***
 1.43%
***
 0.25%
***
 0.60
***
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Table 11 Institutional investors and return spread across cash holding quintiles 
This table reports cash holdings, excess return and risk adjusted return on portfolios 
sorted by cash holdings quintiles and institutional quintiles independently. „Diff (5-1)‟ 
represents the difference in cash holdings and abnormal returns between highest quintile 
cash holdings firms and lowest quintile cash holding firms. Panel A, Panel B and Panel C 
reports the average value of cash and abnormal return across cash holding quintiles in 
firms with lowest quintile, medium quintile and highest quintile of institutional investors 
respectively. „Difflow-Diffhigh‟ is the Difference in abnormal returns spread by cash 
between HIO and LIO. 
Quintiles Cash Ret-Rf αmkt α3factor 
Panel A Lowest quintile of Institutional Investors (LIO) 
1 0.008 0.564 0.065 -0.096 
2 0.034 0.619 0.077 -0.022 
3 0.090 1.232 0.692 0.563 
4 0.209 1.300 0.708 0.683 
5 0.513 1.660 1.057 1.093 
Diff(5-1)  1.096 0.992 1.189 
T-statistics 5.17 3.87 4.9 
Panel B Medium quintile of Institutional Investors (MIO) 
1 0.008 0.506 -0.172 -0.464 
2 0.034 0.831 0.115 -0.188 
3 0.088 0.997 0.280 0.052 
4 0.214 1.131 0.385 0.348 
5 0.523 1.262 0.475 0.591 
Diff(5-1)  0.756 0.647 1.055 
T-statistics 2.98 1.98 3.65 
Panel C Highest quintile of Institutional Investors (HIO) 
1 0.009 0.703 0.058 -0.129 
2 0.035 0.855 0.204 0.059 
3 0.091 0.826 0.150 0.044 
4 0.203 0.954 0.193 0.237 
5 0.446 1.017 0.137 0.430 
Diff(5-1)  0.314 0.079 0.560 
T-statistics 1.18 0.24 2.34 
Difference in abnormal returns spread by cash between HIO and LIO 
Difflow-Diffhigh  0.782 0.914 0.630 
T-statistics  2.99 2.85 2.39 
 
 
